Abstract: This paper develops a two-sector overlapping generations (OLG) model of the co-evolution of urbanization, saving, and fertility in developing economies. Children are viewed as a means of old-age support, particularly in the rural sector, as well as a good valued for its own sake. It is shown that, under plausible parameter assumptions, a very mild rate of technological change is sufficient to yield large increases in the saving rate and in the level of urbanization, and large decreases in the fertility rate over time, which accords well with the experience of the Asian Tigers.
Introduction
The "economic miracle"in East Asia has been studied by a large and growing literature, motivated by the hope that the lessons to be learned from this miracle can be applied in other developing countries. One of the most striking aspects of this miracle has been the huge increase in the savings rate in these countries, enabling high rates of economic growth according to the neoclassical growth model. In Taiwan, for example, the savings rate increased from about 10 percent in 1955 to more than 50 percent in 1990.
In South Korea, the corresponding increase was from about 5 percent in 1955 to approximately 35 percent in 1990, and similarly for the other Asian Tigers. Over the same time period, fertility dropped sharply in these countries. The average total fertility rate (TFR) in East Asia declined from more than …ve children in 1955 to approximately two children in 1990.
The traditional explanation of the increase in the savings rate, deriving from the life-cycle (LC) model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) , is that the decrease in the number of children per family lowered the dependency rate, thus increasing households'income net of the costs of raising children, and inducing an increase in the savings rate. Empirical evidence, however, has not consistently supported this explanation. 1 Indeed, while in South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia the increase in the savings rate approximately coincided with the decrease in the population share of individuals aged less than 16 (thus supporting the LC hypothesis), in Thailand the savings rate began its sharp rise about 15 years before the decrease in the less-than-16 dependency rate, and in India the dependency rate has stayed approximately constant despite the increase in the savings rate.
The present paper endogenizes urbanization, fertility and savings decisions. The paper shows that both the increase in the savings rate and the decline in the fertility rate (which increase growth in per capita income) partially can be explained by rural-to-urban migration, which in turn is a consequence of growth of per capita income, via Engel's Law. 2 Thus ur- 1 See Hammer (1986) and Schultz (2005) for surveys of the literature. 2 I am indebted to my late teacher, D. Gale Johnson, for pointing out the role of Engel's banization is caused by growth and also can cause growth. Urbanization is transforming a traditional familial system in which children are raised in order to obtain old-age support, to a modern system with weak family ties and monetized support for the elderly through individual savings. 3 The literature on urbanization and growth has emphasized the role of cities in the accumulation of human capital and the stimulation of technological change. These e¤ects were recognized already by Marshall (1890) , who pointed out that in cities "the mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are, as it were, in the air." The recent literature begins with the pioneering contributions of Jacobs (1969 Jacobs ( , 1984 and continues through the models of Glomm (1992) , Glaeser (1999) , Zhang (2002) , Lucas (2004) , and Sato and Yamamoto (2005) , among others. The formal structure of the present model is closer, however, to the work of Shin (1995) , who emphasizes the role of Engel's Law in explaining urbanization as a consequence of growth. 4 Nevertheless, the present model incorporates the basic insight of the literature by endogenizing technological change, making it an increasing function of the level of urbanization of the economy. Section 2 of this paper presents a simple two-sector overlapping generations (OLG) growth model in which children are raised for old-age support as well as for the direct utility they provide. Section 3 presents simulations of the model. Section 4 concludes.
Model
In the model, individuals live three time periods: childhood, active adulthood and old age. When they are active adults, individuals raise children, support their elderly parents, and save income for their old age. When old, they are supported by their children and by their saved income. Before developing the model in detail, however, I …rst address a question that has Law in causing urbanization.
3 For a related model in which endogenous family ties are linked to endogenous labor regulations which lead to static ine¢ ciencies (as opposed to dynamic ine¢ ciencies, in the present model), see Alesina et al. (2010) . 4 Glomm (1992) Theories following the …rst approach introduce "non-standard" preferences. One such approach (see, e.g., Becker, 1988 ) is simply to assume that children are altruistic toward their parents, just as economists (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974 Becker, , 1981 Becker, , 1991 ; and others) recognize that parents are altruistic toward their children. Becker (1993 Becker ( , 1996 has also proposed that parents may be able to in ‡uence the preferences of their children so as to make them want to support their parents. A complementary approach, that of Cox and Stark (1996) , refers to a "demonstration e¤ect:"when children observe their parents supporting their grandparents, the children develop preferences to support their parents. While some empirical support has been found for this e¤ect (Mitrut and Wol¤, 2009 ), the demonstration e¤ect theory has several logical di¢ culties (see Jellal and Wol¤, 2002; Bergstrom and Stark, 1993 But then generation T 2 would also not support its parents, and so forth, back to the …rst generation whose expectations have adapted to a changing economic environment.
In static economic environments, the family constitution approach has the advantage of making only standard assumptions about preferences, and therefore being capable of explaining why the intrafamilial old-age support system is relied upon by the vast majority of parents in traditional societies. 5 In contrast, the explanatory power of the …rst group of theories is open to question. But, as noted above, the family constitution theory is a priori very weak in economies undergoing change. The in…nite-horizon assumption is simply untenable in such economies.
In Guttman (2001a Guttman ( , 2001b ) I proposed an alternative explanation of children's support of their elderly parents, which synthesizes aspects of the previous two sets of theories. Like the …rst group of theories that posit nonopportunistic preferences, parents are assumed to invest time and e¤ort to inculcate preferences for reciprocity in their children. But unlike the other theories of the …rst category, the e¢ cacy of such parental "moral education"
is not assumed to extend beyond a minority of the individuals in society. In other words, a minority of agents are assumed to be reciprocators due to parental training. 
Assumptions of the model
In the present model [unlike the model of Guttman (2001a Guttman ( , 2001b )] parents do not invest resources in order to inculcate preferences for reciprocity in their children. Instead (and like standard reputation models) it is assumed that a certain, exogenous proportion of the population, 2 (0; 1); consists of reciprocator types. 6 For simplicity, it is assumed that the type of the children is statistically independent of the type of the parents.
Agents are assumed to live three time periods, childhood (period 0), active adulthood (period 1) and old age (period 2). Children are purely passive and therefore play no role in the model. In each period, agents receive utility from consumption c and the number of children n t . 7 Thus the lifetime utility of an agent (starting in adulthood) is
where the subscripts denote the time period t that the agent enters adulthood (which indicates the agent's cohort) and the time period in the agent's life, 1 or 2. This utility function will be speci…ed in greater detail below.
It is assumed that the agent's decision whether to support his or her parents is made before the remaining decisions regarding the arguments of U: As argued in Guttman (2001a Guttman ( , 2001b , the agent supports his or her parents if either (a) the agent is a reciprocator type (which has probability ), or (b) the agent is located in a rural area and therefore supports his or her parents for reputational reasons. 8 As in Guttman (2001a Guttman ( , 2001b as well as in most of the other models cited above, the agent's decision whether to support his or her parents is treated as a binary decision: either the agent supports his or her parents at a socially mandated level g; or he or she does not support them at all.
The socially mandated level of children's support of their parents, g; is assumed to be an increasing, concave function of the per capita income of the parents when they were economically active. 9 In other words, a rich community will expect the children to support their parents at a higher 7 For simplicity, the parents are assumed to be unable to invest in the "quality"of their children. 8 As shown in Guttman (2001a Guttman ( , 2001b , in the latter case an opportunistic agent will not support his or her parents in the last stages of his or her "career." As in Kreps, et al. (1982) , the number of these endgame stages is independent of the overall number of stages of the agent's career. The number of stages in the agent's career is taken to be very large, allowing us to ignore the implied reduction in the support that the average agent provides to his or her parents. 9 The use of the parents' per capita income as the basis of the standard of support simpli…es the analysis, by avoiding the need for the agent to form expectations of his children's income in order to decide how to allocate his own wealth between consumption in period 1 and consumption in period 2 of his lifetime. level than a poor community, but the expected level of support-given that it is supposed to cover basic needs-does not increase linearly with the per capita income of the community. 10 In 11 To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the adult agent contracts the care for his or her children to a nursemaid, who provides this care at the price of w t per child where 2 (0; 1). It is assumed that the number of nursemaids is very small relative to the number of other economically active adults, so that we may ignore their consumption and saving decisions in the following analysis.
The agent has one unit of time, which he or she devotes entirely to working (the agent has no preference for leisure). Thus the agent maximizes U t subject to two constraints. The …rst constraint is the …rst-period budget constraint
where w t is the wage rate at time t, n t is the number of children the agent raises, and S t is savings. This constraint is written on the assumption that the agent supports his or her parents. If this assumption does not hold, the
t 1 term will be absent from the equation. The agent's second-period budget constraint is
1 0 This assumption is supported by evidence for Malaysia presented in Lillard and Willis (1997 , Table 7 ), who …nd that the income elasticity of money support from women to their parents is approximately 0.34, while the corresponding elasticity for men is 0.25 for permanent earnings, and 0.15 for current earnings.
1 1 While we have been using the terminology "parents" in the plural, the model treats the parents as a single agent, for simplicity.
where the R t is 1 plus the rate of return on savings, and is the probability that each child will support his or her parents, which takes one of two values:
1 for children residing in a rural area and 2 (0; 1) for children residing in an urban area.
The proportion t 2 (0; 1) of the total adult population N t resides in urban areas, and the proportion 1 t resides in rural areas. The variable t is endogenous. All economically active adults residing in urban areas produce a manufactured good, widgets, denoted m, while all those residing in rural areas produce food, denoted f . The sectors producing these two goods are both assumed to be perfectly competitive.
It is assumed that both goods are produced by two factors, labor and capital. In order to make the model tractable and to focus on the issues of central interest, it is assumed that the relative intensity of the two factors are the same in the two sectors. A constant returns to scale (CRS)
Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed in both sectors. Thus the production function of food is
where A f t > 0 is a technology parameter; 2 (0; 1); L f t is the amount of labor and K f t is the amount of capital in the rural sector. Since each adult agent in the rural sector is assumed to work in the production of food, and each worker supplies one unit of labor time, we have
The production function of widgets is
where A mt > 0 is a technology parameter: Again, there are t N t workers in the urban sector, and each supplies one unit of labor time, so that
As indicated in the Introduction, the model incorporates Engel's Law, which states that the income elasticity of demand for food is less than unity.
Accordingly, the utility function is assumed to be non-homothetic. For simplicity, the utility function is (the logarithm of) a Stone-Geary utility function 12
where 2 (0; 1) is a preference parameter, 2 (0; 1) is the discount parameter and f > 0 is a minimum "subsistence" level of food consumption. Note that the agent also has a minimum "acceptable"number of children, namely
1. Since we are assuming, for simplicity of exposition, that the agent raises children without a mate, one child is the minimum required for replacement of the current population.
The price of food is normalized to unity. The price of widgets is p mt :
Thus the value of consumption which appears in (1) and (2) is
and c 2;t = f 2t + p m;t+1 m 2t :
(Note that the subscript t + 1 in p m;t+1 refers to the price of widgets at time t + 1 which is period 2 of the cohort dated t.)
Capital is accumulated by diverting widgets from current consumption to production in the next time period. Over this time interval, the widgets "mature"(e.g., seedlings mature into trees), yielding a marginal return whose present value at time t is 13
1 2 See Stone (1954). 1 3 The fraction 1=pmt appears on the left-hand side because the price of a widget is pmt while the price of a unit of food is unity. On the right-hand side, which is the marginal return to capital in the urban sector, pmt appears in both the numerator and denominator and therefore cancels out.
where R t is 1 plus the interest rate. After this one-period return, the invested widget completely depreciates. Thus
where K t+1 is the economy-wide stock of capital at time t + 1 and S t is the level of saving at time t:
R t is bounded below by 1, since if the interest rate were negative (implying R t < 1), agents would simply store widgets for consumption or sale in the next time period, rather than investing them in widgets-as-capital.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the cost of storage is zero.
Analysis of the model 2.3.1 The consumer' s problem
To solve the consumer's problem we form the Lagrangian, using (1), (2), (5), and (6),
where t and t are Lagrangian multipliers. (Again, if the agent does not support his or her parents, the g 0 w
1=2
t 1 term will be absent.) We obtain the following …rst-order conditions:
and
Combining (8) and (9), we obtain
where the asterisk denotes the optimal value. Similarly, using (10) and (11), we have
Equation (13) implies
Combining (8), (10) and (18), we obtain
and, by combining (17) and (19),
Endogenous fertility
We now turn to the agent's demand for children. Using (12) and (18), we obtain n f t = 1 + t w t t g 0 p w t for farm families (denoted by f in the subscript on the left-hand side),
where the probability that the children will support their parents is unity. 14 Dividing the numerator and denominator of the fraction on the right-hand side by t and substituting (10), (18) and (19), we obtain
Similarly, for urban families,
where the probability that the children will support their parents is < 1. 15 (To be more precise, n ut will di¤er between opportunistic and reciprocatortype agents, since their optimal food consumption will di¤er, because of their di¤ering decisions regarding whether to support their parents.) Thus, for a given level of period 1 food consumption, rural families have more children than urban families, since raising children is a better investment in rural areas. These equations also make clear that, in this model, an increased return on alternative investments, R t ; as well as an increased wage rate w t ;
reduce the demand for children, by raising their opportunity cost.
Conditions of general equilibrium
Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile between the two sectors. Therefore, in equilibrium, the wage rate will be equal in the two sectors. Since all markets are competitive, the value of the marginal product of labor will be equal to the wage in both sectors:
Equality of the marginal rate of technical substitution between capital and labor in the two sectors implies
in equilibrium. Combining (23) and (24), we obtain (25) and
where 27) since N t = L t by assumption, and the superscript hat denotes the equilibrium value. From (25), we obtain the following result: If there is no technological change, or if technological change in the two sectors proceeds at the same rate, then the price of widgets will be constant over time and will equal A f t =A mt :
Equilibrium saving and consumption
Consider an adult agent in the rural sector. Substituting (16), (21), (26) and (27) into (1), we obtain
for the agent's equilibrium …rst-period budget constraint (the subscript f on the right-hand side denotes "farm"which corresponds to its meaning on the left-hand side, "food"). The corresponding constraint for an opportunistic urban agent (who does not support his or her parents, as argued in Section 2.1) is
where the subscript uo denotes "urban-opportunistic" and the subscript u denotes "urban," as in (22) . Finally, the corresponding constraint for a reciprocator-type urban agent (who does support his or her parents) is
where the subscript ur denotes "urban-reciprocator."
Substituting (19), (20) , and (21) into (2) and simplifying, the secondperiod budget constraint for a rural adult agent is
Using (22) instead of (21), the corresponding constraint for an opportunistic urban agent is
and, for a reciprocator-type urban agent,
Solving (28) and (29) simultaneously, we obtain the optimal saving and …rst-period food consumption of a rural adult. The resulting expressions are very messy and unenlightening. For example, the agent's optimal saving is
Similar expressions can be derived for the urban agents by solving ( 28 0 ) and (29 0 ) simultaneously (for opportunistic agents), and (28 00 ) and (29 00 )
simultaneously (for opportunistic agents). Using (16), (17), and (19), the equilibrium consumption of food in period 2 of the agent's life and his or her consumption of widgets in both periods can be derived from these expressions, for each agent type.
Once the equilibrium consumption and saving decisions are derived for the three types of agent (urban-opportunistic, urban-reciprocator, and rural), it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium t , the proportion of the population living in urban areas. Recall that savings are invested to purchase widgets which serve as investment goods as well as consumption goods, and that widgets are produced only in cities, while food is produced only in rural areas. In equilibrium, the demand for widgets is Given our assumption that the production functions of the two sectors are CRS and are identical except for their technology coe¢ cients A f t and
Solving (30) for t , we obtain the equilibrium distribution of the population (and the capital stock) between the two sectors. 16 
Simulations
In order to run simulations, one must address the issue of agents'formation of expectations regarding (a) the period-2 price of widgets p m;t+1 , and (b) the period-2 marginal productivity of capital, which determines the period-1 interest rate R t , as in equation (6), where both sides of that equation equal 1.
The problem of specifying p m;t+1 is avoided by making technological change progress at the same rate in the two sectors, which keeps p m constant, as noted above at the end of Section 2.3.3. Regarding the speci…cation of the interest rate, an iterative procedure was used to approximate agents' rational expectation of @Q m;t+1 =@K m;t+1 : This procedure begins with generation t's "inherited" capital stock K t and population size N t . Using the economy-wide capital-labor ratio K t =N t , one obtains a …rst approximation to @Q m;t+1 =@K m;t+1 [noting that the economy-wide capital-labor ratio will equal, in equilibrium, the same ratio in both sectors, as stated by (24)].
Given this …rst approximation, R t is set equal to @Q mt =@K mt : The …rst approximation of R t is then used to derive equilibrium saving S t and fertility.
Using S t and projected population growth, an estimate of the next-period marginal productivity of capital @Q m;t+1 =@K m;t+1 can be derived. R t is accordingly revised, by taking the average of the estimated @Q m;t+1 =@K m;t+1
and of the …rst approximation of R t . 17 The new approximation of R t is then used again to derive equilibrium saving and fertility, and the procedure repeats itself until the di¤erence between the revised estimate of R t and that of the previous iteration is within a preset level of tolerance, 0. for which there are established estimates, these parameter assumptions are 1 7 Taking this average was found to speed convergence. 1 8 In the simulations reported here, the maximum number of iterations is 1,000, and nevertheless in the second and third generations the procedure did not converge to this level of tolerance. In all other generations, however, convergence to within this tolerance level was achieved. 1 9 The results are actually very similar if an exogenous rate of technological change of 2 percent per generation is assumed. Engel's Law. As per capita income increases, a larger share of income is devoted to consumption of widgets, shifting the labor force into the cities. Figure 2 shows the average saving rates for the urban population (upper curve), rural population (lower curve) and the economy-wide average saving rate (middle curve). The rural population displays a distinctly lower saving rate, since its fertility rate is much higher (see Figure 3 below), and children substitute for savings. Over time, however, the saving rates in both populations increase steadily, which can be explained by two forces:
Period-1 income is increasing while period-2 income (aside from accumulated savings and transfers from children) is zero, and optimal consumption increases in both periods proportionately to income. Therefore, in order to …nance the increase in period-2 consumption, saving must increase, both absolutely and relative to period-1 income.
Children become progressively less "pro…table"because of an increase in their relative price, due to the secular increase in the wage rate (Figure 4 below) . Since children substitute for savings as a source of period-2 income, the saving rate increases. Figure 3 shows the average fertility rates for the urban and rural sectors, as well as the economy-wide average. Recall that we have assumed, for simplicity of exposition, that the "parents" are a single agent. Given this assumption, the fertility rates on the vertical axis of Figure 3 should be multiplied by 2 in order to compare them to observed fertility rates (e.g., a fertility rate of 1 corresponds to exact replacement of the current population, while in reality the corresponding fertility rate is 2). The overall trend is downward, despite the positive e¤ect of the decline in the interest rate (see Figure 5 below). The decline in the fertility rate, as noted above, is a result of the secular increase in the wage rate, which increases the relative cost of raising children. Figure 4 shows the wage rate, w t . The increase is due both to technological change and to an increase in the capital-labor ratio. The increase in the capital-labor ratio, in turn, is caused by high and rising saving rates and declining fertility rates, as shown above. Under the assumed parameter values, the capital-labor ratio increases from 0.83 in generation 1 to approximately 18 in generation 100. (It should be recalled that 100 generations are equivalent to approximately 2,000 years.) The result of this increase in the capital-labor ratio is a steady decline in the interest rate, shown in Figure   5 . (Recall that R t is not a per annum interest rate, but rather 1 plus the per-generation interest rate, so that an initial R t of 2.6 translates to only 2.4 percent per annum, assuming that a generation is 20 years.) This decline 
